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RECENT CASE
JUDICIAL REVIEW OF SHIPOWNER AND STEVEDORE
LIABILITY UNDER THE LONGSHOREMEN'S AND
HARBOR WORKERS' COMPENSATION ACT
Edmonds v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique
99 S. Ct. 2753 (1978)
The apportionment of liability in cases of tripartite litigation aris-
ing from an injury to a longshoreman produced by the concurrent
negligence of the shipowner and the stevedore-employer has been
in dispute ever since the common law norms were partially displaced
by the enactment of the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Com-
pensation Act (LHWCA) of 1927,1 its 1972 Amendments, 2 and the
growing acceptance of comparative negligence standards in the fields
of admiralty, workmen's compensation, and tort law. The majority
interpretation of the LHWCA, prevalent since 1972, is the object of
the dispute in Edmonds. This interpretation suggests that the Act
compels the stevedore to compensate its injured employee to the
extent of statutorily-set schedules, allows the longshoreman to bring
an action for damages against the shipowner, and grants the stevedore
or its insurance carrier a lien against any recovery by the longshore-
man from the shipowner up to the amount of the compensation pay-
ments. Under this analysis, the shipowner has no right to indemnity,
contribution, offset, or credit from the concurrently negligent steve-
dore-employer. The Fourth Circuit rejected this majority rule in its
Edmonds opinion in favor of a comparative negligence standard.'
Confronted with a division in the lower courts, the Supreme Court
of the United States reversed the Fourth Circuit and reestablished
the validity of the majority rule in Edmonds v. Compagnie Generale
Transatlantique.
4
The litigation arose from an injury suffered on March 3, 1974, by
longshoreman Stanley Edmonds, an employee of Nacirema Operating
1. 33 U.S.C. §§ 901-950 (Supp. 1979) (original version at 44 Stat. 1245
(1927)).
2. Pub. L. No. 92-576, 86 Stat. 1263 (1972) (amending 33 U.S.C. §§ 901-
950 (1970)).
3. Edmonds v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 577 F.2d 1153 (4th
Cir. 1978) [hereinafter cited as Edmonds].
4. 99 S, Ct. 2753 (1978) (5-3 decision, J.J. Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens,
dissenting; Powell, J. did not participate in the decision).
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Co. (a stevedore), while unloading cargo from a vessel owned by
the Compagnie Generale Transatlantique (CGT). Edmonds received
the LHWCA statutory compensation benefits from the stevedore-
employer and alleging negligence, instituted an action for damages
in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia against
the shipowner (CGT) as a third party. A jury trial resulted in a
verdict in favor of Edmonds in the amount of $100,000 and a finding
that the stevedore was seventy percent negligent in causing the acci-
dent, the shipowner twenty percent negligent, and Edmonds ten per-
cent contributorily negligent. Despite the finding of preponderant
fault on the part of the stevedore, the Court entered judgment against
the shipowner in the amount of $90,000, discounting the award only
by the extent of the longshoreman's comparative negligence.5 This
holding conformed to the traditional interpretation of liability appor-
tionment under -the LHWCA.
CGT appealed to the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals on the
ground, inter alia, that its liability should have been limited to that
proportion of total damages equivalent to the degree of its own com-
parative negligence. The Court, partially agreeing, vacated and re-
manded. A shipowner's liability, it held, should be limited to its
degree of comparative negligence plus "any valid lien the stevedore
may have on the recovery by the longshoreman, but. .. not to exceed
the whole amount of the possible award against the vessel...." On
rehearing, this decision was reversed and remanded by the Court en
banc. Reasoning that the 1972 amendments to the LHWCA had
altered the traditional maritime rule embodied in the District Court's
holding, the Court's new holding conformed to CGT's proposed rule:
a shipowner's liability for a longshoreman's injury is proportionate to
the vessel's own comparative negligence in causing that injury.
The Fourth Circuit's opinion did not establish a particularly
powerful argument for this holding. Principally, the Court's reasoning
was that the new first and second sentences of the LHWCA's amended
Section 905(b), the controlling damage-apportionment statute, con-
flicted with each other and ".... [were] irreconcilable if read to mean
that any negligence on the part of the stevedore [would] defeat it.
They may be harmonized only if read in apportioned terms."" The
Court also remarked that ". . . it is hardly rational to suppose that,
without any right of indemnification, the Congress intended to impose
5. Edmonds, 577 F.2d at 1154.
6. Id. at 1155.
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a liability upon the ship for all damages suffered when the ship may
have been only slightly at fault and the stevedore very greatly so," 7
and noted that the decision was consistent with the expansion of com-
parative negligence and the policy underlying that expansion.
Two judges dissented from the majority's opinion. Judge Hall
noted that the other judicial circuits remained united behind the
traditional maritime rule and stressed the disadvantages of inconsistent
law. He denied that a conflict existed between the first and second
sentences of Section 905(b), as the majority claimed. Faced with
a "constitutional act of congress," he felt that a change in the law
such as the majority envisaged should not come from the courts, but
from Congress.' In a separate dissent, Judge Weidner favored the
Circuit Court's first opinion on the matter.
It is noteworthy that the Court chose not to enter the relatively
extensive field of legal precedent and scholarly commentary on the
issue. First, the Court's opinion was unsupported by any cited case.
Second, the opinion failed to raise the more telling arguments for its
position that are found in the literature, notably the pro tanto,
pro rata, or equitable credit schemes advanced to circumvent the
LHWCA's prohibition of contribution. Third, the Court accorded no
weight to (indeed, it did not even comment upon) the mass of legal
precedent arrayed against it. Prior to the Fourth Circuit's decision in
Edmonds, all circuit courts considering the issue after the enactment
of the 1972 LHWCA amendments had rejected the notion of stevedore
liability to the shipowner under any theory. Such was the position of
the First, Second, Third, Fifth, and Ninth Circuit Courts.
Upon a writ of certiorari granted to resolve the conflict below,
the Supreme Court held, reversed and remanded: (1) in enacting the
1972 amendments to the LHWCA, Congress did not intend to sub-
stitute a proportionate-fault rule in place of the established maritime
tort rule allowing an injured longshoreman-employee to recover all
damages not caused by his own negligence from the negligent ship-
owner, notwithstanding the stevedore-employer's own concurrent
negligence; and (2) Supreme Court changes in this established mari-
time rule are precluded given preemptive Congressional action in
balancing the rights and liabilities of longshoremen, stevedores, and
shipowners.
7. Id.
8. Id. at 1158,
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The Court's opinion followed five lines of reasoning and was
prefaced by a short general exposition of the legal background of
tripartite litigation in cases of longshoreman injury. This opening
section noted the pertinent LHWCA provisions and cited the leading
Supreme Court cases, including Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki,9 Halcyon
Lines v. Haenn Ship Ceiling & Refitting Corp.,10 Pope & Talbot, Inc.
v. Hawn,11 Ryan Stevedoring Co. v. Pan-Atlantic S. S. Corp.,2 and
Cooper Stevedoring Co. v. Fritz Kopke, Inc." A review of this back-
ground is important in order to understand the Court's holding, for as
the Court commented, part of the difficulty which the courts have had
with this issue is due to the problem of squaring admiralty and com-
mon law concepts with statutory provisions.
In 1876, admiralty law incorporated the common law rule which
permitted an injured party to sue concurrent, indivisibly responsible
tortfeasors, either jointly or severally, and to recover total damages
from one or all, with another common law rule which prohibited
contribution between concurrent tortfeasors. This enabled an injured
longshoreman to bring an action against both negligent parties-the
shipowner and the stevedore. The right of recovery, however, was
curtailed in 1927 by enactment of the LHWCA. With its enactment,
the stevedores were obligated to pay an injured longshoreman-em-
ployee compensation tailored to the longshoreman's medical injury
and earning level, regardless of where the fault for the injury lay. In
return for participating in this compensation scheme, a negligent
stevedore was shielded from damage suits brought by the injured
employee. This shield was created by the LHWCA's so-called "ex-
clusivity clause"-still in effect today-which provides that a stevedore-
employer's obligation to pay the statutory compensation benefits to
an injured longshoreman was to ". . . be exclusive and in place of
all other liability of such employer to the employee . . .and anyone
otherwise entitled to recover damages from such employer at law or
in admiralty on account of such injury or death." 1 Seemingly, this
clause also protected the negligent stevedore from liability for con-
tribution to any other concurrently negligent party, notably ship--
owners.
9. 328 U.S. 85 (1946).
10. 342 U.S. 282 (1952).
11. 346 U.S. 406 (1953).
12. 350 U.S. 124 (1956).
13. 412 U.S. 106 (1974).
14. See LHWCA, supra note 1, at § 905(a).
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The balance of the various parties' rights and liabilities effectuated
by Congress via the LHWCA was altered by the Supreme Court in
1946 with Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki, which vastly expanded the
shipowner's liability to an injured longshoreman. Sieracki replaced
the shipowner's traditional standard of care with an absolute, non-
delegable obligation to provide the longshoreman with a seaworthy
vessel. This duty amounted to liability without fault for most on-
board injuries. Its severity was illustrated by a case in which a
shipowner was held liable for a longshoreman's injury which was
produced by the failure of equipment owned and in the sole control
of the stevedore.
Awash in a flood of damage actions, shipowners attempted to
shift all or part of the costs of these actions to the stevedores when
these employers were wholly or partially responsible for the injuries.
The issue of stevedore contribution was raised before the Supreme
Court in Halcyon Lines v. Haenn Ship Ceiling & Refitting Corp., in
1952, and Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. Hawn, in 1953. In Halcyon (al-
though the issue of contribution was not actually reached), the Court
denied contribution on the grounds that "the solution of this problem
should await Congressional action" 15 in view of Congress' extensive
involvement in the field of maritime personal injury, the comparative
preferability of a legislative, as opposed to a judicial, solution of such
an intricate problem, and the fact that Congress had "... stopped
short of approving the rule of contribution here urged." In Pope &
Talbot, the shipowner did not seek contribution from the concurrently
negligent stevedore since the damages awarded the injured longshore-
man had not yet been paid. Rather, the shipowner asked for a reduc-
tion in the award in proportion to the stevedore's negligence on the
basis that, although the LHWCA allowed a stevedore-employer to
recover the amount paid an employee in compensation, such recovery
... would give an unconscionable reward to an employer whose
negligence contributed to the injury." "T The Court rejected this argu-
ment, ruling that this reduction at the expense of the stevedore
would be the substantial equivalent of contribution which we
declined to require in the Halcyon case.""
In 1956, a fourth Supreme Court case concerning longshoreman
personal injury threw the Congressional balance into further disarray
15. 342 U.S. at 285.
16. Id. at 287.
17. 346 U.S. at 412.
18. Id.
LAWYER OF THE AMERICAS
by effectively nullifying (although not reversing) Sieracki, Halcyon,
and Pope & Talbot. The case was Ryan Stevedoring Co. v. Pan-
Atlantic S. S. Corp., which held that as a matter of contract law, ship-
owners may obtain from stevedores an implied or express warranty of
workmanlike service that may result in the indemnification of the
shipowner for its liability to the longshoreman. The Court found that
the LHWCA exclusivity clause only regulated the relationship be-
tween employer and employee or anyone claiming 'through the em-
ployee. At a stroke, the stevedore-employers shouldered virtually
total liability for damages recovered by their injured employees from
shipowners. In one case, a longshoreman's one percent contributory
negligence in producing his own injury was held to be a sufficient
breach of implied warranty to require his stevedore-employer, who
was not at all negligent, to indemnify the shipowner for total damages.
The Ryan decision, in addition, produced two unforeseen results. One
was an explosion of circular personal injury -litigation that came to
be characterized by the Fifth Circuit as "Donnybrook Fairs." The
second was extensive criticism of the Court for having supplanted
legislatively-determined policy with notions of its own design, a trans-
gression of judicial limits found shocking by some observers.
In 1972, Congress regained its primacy over the balancing of
longshoremen's workers' compensation with the passage of the LHWCA
amendments. As the Supreme Court acknowledged in Edmonds, one
of the Congressional objectives was "to overrule Sieracki and Ryan."
This was explicitly stated in the legislative history. As a result, ship-
owners were no longer to be held absolutely liable under the sea-
worthiness doctrine for injury to longshoremen, nor were stevedores
to be held liable to the shipowner under indemnity, hold-harmless,
contribution, or any other theory of damages for which the shipowner
would be held liable to the injured employee. Unfortunately, awk-
ward statutory language and a laconic legislative history perpetuated
the question of the Congressional intent with regard to the compara-
tive negligence standard in longshoreman tripartite litigation.
As noted, the Edmonds Court used five lines of analysis to resolve
this issue; the first three coalesced in 'the first holding and the fourth
produced the second holding. First, 'the Court analyzed the text
of Section 905(b) to determine if the first and second sentences were
as irreconcilable as the Court of Appeals maintained and whether
the Section altered the traditional maritime rule that the longshoreman
may recover the total of his damages from the negligent shipowner
even if the stevedore's negligence also contributed to the injury. The
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Court decided in the negative on both counts. The first sentence
overrules Ryan, and "the second sentence means no more than that
all longshoremen are to be treated the same whether their employer
is a [sic] independent stevedore or a shipowner-stevedore and that all
stevedores are to be treated the same whether they are independent
or an arm of the shipowner itself." "9 This clarification of the second
sentence's function resolves a major point of confusion in the inter-
pretation of the LHWCA.
Second, the Court turned to the legislative history, again to probe
Congressional intent regarding the traditional maritime rule under
consideration. The Court found "not a word" concerning the abolition
of the rule and commented that "this silence is most eloquent, for
such reticence while contemplating an important and controversial
change in existing law is unlikely." 2  However, the Court did remark
that the Committee report stressed that employers shall not be liable
to vessels "directly or indirectly," and it indicated that this reafirmed
the no-contribution rule of Pope & Talbot.
Third, the Court noted that a reduction of the shipowner's tort
liability under the Court of Appeals' proportional fault system would
not equitably shift the shipowner's financial burden to the stevedore
in ratio to his negligence, but rather would shift the "burden of in-
equity" to the longshoreman. This is so because even though the
longshoreman's total recovery is decreased, the stevedore retains an
undiminished Section 933(b) equitable lien on that recovery. Thus,
the difference between the total recovery and the reduced recovery
would come out of the longshoreman's pocket. The Court rejected
this result: "Some inequity appears inevitable in the present statutory
scheme, but we find nothing to indicate and should not presume that
Congress intended to place the burden of the inequity on the long-
shoreman whom the Act seeks to protect." 21
Fourth, the Court faced the argument that even if Congress did
not change the traditional rule, the Court should. This was rejected
in language strongly reaffirming the validity of Halcyon. The Court
recognized the "delicate balance" which Congress was attempting to
maintain between the rights and liabilities of the numerous parties
involved in longshoremen's workers' compensation. A court-produced
change in this balance, via the Edmonds ruling, "would effectively
19. Edmonds, 99 S. Ct. at 2759.
20. Id. at 2760.
21. Id. at 2762,
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alter the statute by causing it to reach different results than Congress
envisioned .... 22 [W]e should stay our hand in these circumstances." 23
In considering this point, the Court cited Cooper Stevedoring Co. v.
Fritz Kopke, Inc.,24 the last of the five key cases cited in the opin-
ion's opening exposition. In Cooper, a longshoreman was injured
through the concurrent negligence of the shipowner and a stevedore
who was not the longshoreman's employer. The Court held that ship-
owners may recover tort contribution from stevedores who are not
shielded by the exclusivity provision of the LHWCA by virtue of em-
ployer status. The seeming converse of this holding, of course, was
that stevedore-employers are shielded from liability for contribution
by the LHWCA exclusivity provision.
Fifth and last, the Court commented in dicta on the "sound argu-
ments supporting division of damages between parties before the
court on the basis of their comparative fault." 25  This statement,
though not central to the issues in Edmonds, is important because it
signals the Court's continuing support for comparative fault. Cited
with approval in this section was United States v. Reliable Transfer
Co., Inc.,26 the case which virtually completed the conversion of U.S.
admiralty law to the comparative law standard by abolishing the
rule of divided damages in maritime collision cases and replacing it
with a pure comparative fault rule. In Reliable Transfer, the Court
also noted the strong equitable considerations justifying the rule and
its support for the rule in general. In this regard, it should be noted
that the Court's two holdings in Edmonds were pointedly limited on
maritime law: "Our decision does not necessarily have an effect on
situations where the Act provided the workers' compensation scheme
but the third-party action is not governed by the principles of mari-
time law." 27
In dissent, Justice Blackmun summarized the majority opinion
into what he judged were its four basis components: (1) the principle
of comparative negligence does not apply under the traditional law
of admiralty; (2) in enacting the 1972 LHWCA amendments, Con-
gress did not impose a comparative negligence standard; (3) Con-
gress intended to preclude judicial modification of the traditional
22. Id. at 2763.
23. Id. at 2762.
24. See note 13, supra.
25. 99 S. Ct. at 2762.
26. 421 U.S. 397 (1975).
27. 99 S. Ct. at 2763 n.31,
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maritime rule; and (4) comparative negligence would be unfair to
injured longshoremen.
Blackmun rejected each of these four conclusions. On the first
two points, he noted that each of the cases cited by the majority did
not address the comparative negligence issue, but instead addressed
the prohibition of contribution. Furthermore, he noted that Section
905(b) did embody textual discrepancies which, as the Fourth Circuit
maintained, could best be integrated by means of comparative negli-
gence. On the fourth point, he asserted that the limitation of an
injured longshoreman's potential recovery from a shipowner would
not result in "unfairness" to the longshoreman since he would still be
entitled to the statutory compensation benefits. He accepted each
of the three majority conclusions, however, "for the sake of the argu-
ment;" it was in opposition to the third majority conclusion that Justice
Blackmun based his argument. "Courts exercising jurisdiction in mari-
time affairs have broad powers of interstitial rulemaking," he com-
mented, and "Congress has largely left to this Court the responsibility
for fashioning the controlling rules of admiralty law." 28 In addition,
the enactment of Section 905(b) had the narrow purpose of over-
ruling Ryan and Sieracki: "Congress intended to preserve the role of
the Federal Courts in filling in the contours of Section 905(b). " 29
In conclusion, the Edmonds decision was a predictable one which
closely followed the precedents set by Halcyon, Pope & Talbot, and
Cooper. Essentially, this line of cases sought to define the boundary
separating the powers of the judicial and legislative branches in the
area of longshoreman tripartite injury litigation. Cooper, the last of
the cases, merely acknowledged what Halcyon had at an earlier time
determined, namely, that Congress' intent to assume its Constitutional
prerogative to act as arbiter in balancing the rights and liabilities of
longshoremen, stevedores, and shipowners in cases of longshoreman
injury was not to be displaced by the courts. Although Justice
Blackmun may contest this, it is submitted that this intent is sufficiently
manifest in the legislative history of the 1972 amendments.
This holding is significant in that it: (1) clearly delineates the
rights of the parties involved, thus abating excessive litigation; (2)
it precludes future judicial tampering with the apportionment stan-
dard in favor of Congressional action; and (3) reaffirms the Supreme
28. Id. at 2765 (quoting United States v. Reliable Transfer, note 26 supra).
29. Id.
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Court's support for the comparative negligence standard to the extent
that discernible Congressional intent is not contravened. This last
point would seem also to be the most important for foreign observers,
reinforcing as it does the belated, but secure, U.S. conversion to the
comparative negligence standard in the field of maritime law, a posi-
tion more in conformity with that taken by the rest of -the world.
ALBERTO MORA
